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Abstract. We posit and empirically test the hypothesis that airlines are able to charge a fare
premium inmarkets that originate in their domestic country relative to similarmarkets that
originate in foreign countries. To this end, we focus on international one-stop air travel
trips for which the main, intercontinental, flight legs are identical, whereas the feeder legs
depart from a mixture of domestic and foreign airports. We collect a unique database of
published fares for such trips and estimate reduced form fare regressions with main flight
leg fixed effects. We find that trips from and to domestic airports (compared with foreign
airports) are characterized by approximately 9% higher fares, even after controlling for the
competitive environment and a large range of origin characteristics. These findings dem-
onstrate that airlines have substantial domestic market power, enabling them to raise fares
at their domestic airports irrespective of aforementionedmarket conditions. Themagnitude of
this domestic country premium is large relative to the traditional airport dominance premium,
suggesting that the distinction between domestic and foreign origins is a crucial determinant
of the degree of market power that airlines can exert in the international airline industry.
Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.2018.0863.
Keywords: airline competition • market power • price discrimination • international aviation
1. Introduction
This paper offers a new perspective on the sources of
market power in the airline industry. We assess the de-
gree to which airlines have domestic market power, by
which we mean the ability to charge higher fares, other
things equal, in their domestic country relative to foreign
countries. To this end, we depart from the extant focus
of airline market power studies on domestic airline com-
petition and consider an international airline industry
in which airlines compete for traffic in their domestic
country as well as in countries other than the one where
they are principally established.
The study of the sources and consequences of airline
market power has been central in the aviation economics
literature since Levine (1987) and Borenstein (1989).
Domestic airline industries, in particular the U.S. do-
mestic airline industry, have received considerable at-
tention. Here, it has been firmly established that one
of the most important sources of airline market power
is airport dominance, resulting in higher average fares
paid for travel out of and into airports where one airline
serves a large share of the market (see, e.g., Borenstein
1989; Berry 1990; Evans and Kessides 1993; Lee and
Luengo-Prado 2005; Berry, Carnall, and Spiller 2006;
Bilotkach andPai 2014; andZhang et al. 2014). This airport
dominance effect is more important than route domi-
nance in determining the degree of airline market power
(Evans and Kessides 1993, Bilotkach and Lakew 2014).
Others have demonstrated that the relative value
of the dominant airline’s frequent flier program
(Lederman 2008) and control over (scarce) airport fa-
cilities (Ciliberto andWilliams 2010, Snider andWilliams
2015) represent two mechanisms through which air-
lines transform their dominant position into higher
fares. Beyond domestic markets, the studies by Lijesen,
Rietveld, and Nijkamp (2001) and Bilotkach (2007) pro-
vide evidence of the airport dominance effect in inter-
national markets.
The main thrust of our paper concerns the ability of
airlines to charge a fare premium at airports within their
domestic country. We conceptualize the airline’s national
identity as an alternative source of market power that
might play an important role in international airline
competition. To empirically investigate this issue, we set
out a novel identification strategy that enables estimation
of the additional rate charged by airlines for trips made to
and fromdomestic airports over the fares that they charge
for comparable trips from foreign airports. An important
aspect of our empirical approach is thatwe, among others,
separate this “domestic country premium” from the tra-
ditional “airport dominance premium,” so that the former
indicates the fare markup that airlines can command at
their domestic airports independent ofwhether they serve
a large or small share of the market at that airport.
1
Our focus on domestic market power in the airline
industry is motivated by a number of demand- and
supply-side factors favoring domestic airlines. On
the demand side, it is likely that travelers view domestic
and foreign airlines as imperfect substitutes (Armington
1969). Travelers may be positively biased toward do-
mestic products and services owing to nationalistic
sentiments or a desire to protect the domestic economy
(Shimp and Sharma 1987, Verlegh and Steenkamp 1999,
Verlegh 2007). Such motives might be especially prev-
alent in the airline industry, because airlines are typically
regarded as important drivers of economic activity and
to some extent still represent objects of national pride.
Domestic airlines may also be better able to tailor their
services to local tastes, for instance by serving local food
and communication in the local language. In addition,
airlines typically have a long history of market presence
in their domestic country. This may confer domestic
airlines with persistent competitive advantages, such as
brand familiarity, persistent beliefs about the quality
of the brand, or brand buying habits, that are not
easily copied by (foreign) competitors that have en-
tered the market at a later stage (see, e.g., Bain 1956;
Schmalensee 1982; Bronnenberg, Dhar, and Dubé 2009;
and Bronnenberg, Dubé, and Gentzkow 2012). These
competitive advantages may be reinforced by the do-
mestic airline’s frequent flier program, which creates
switching costs and incentives to concentrate purchases
with a single airline (Carlsson andLöfgren 2006; Lederman
2007, 2008). In a recent paper, De Jong, Behrens, and
van Ommeren (2018) show that domestic consumers
aremuchmore likely to bemembers of their owndomestic
airline’s frequent flier program andmay therefore have
higher switching costs relative to foreign consumers.1
On the supply side, concerns remain regarding dis-
tortionary governmental involvement in the airline in-
dustry (see, e.g., De Wit 2014 and Morrison and De Wit
2016). De Wit (2014) provides an overview of protec-
tionist measures taken by European governments in
favor of their domestic airline. Some measures go as far
as precluding price leadership by foreign airlines.2 It is
straightforward that governmental interventions of this
sort hinder (foreign) competition and may sustain the
ability of airlines to charge relatively high fares on their
domestic-originating routes. The airlines’ better ability
to lobby, or higher degree of political connectedness
in their domestic countries, may further harness their
favorable position (Brown 2016).
For our empirical analysis, we collect a unique data
set including published fares offered by two leading
European airlines: Air France and Lufthansa. Published
fares provide the opportunity to examine the revenue-
maximizing price-setting behavior of airlines, thus re-
vealing their (anticipated) ability to command higher
prices. The European airline industry is well-suited for
our analysis because it is characterized by multiple
closely spaced countries, a fine-meshed web of borders,
and distinct domestic airline brands (e.g., Air France for
France, Lufthansa for Germany, British Airways for the
United Kingdom). Our identification strategy relies on
the route network structure of European airlines, which
typically contain a large number of one-stop connecting
flights to a given destination from amixture of domestic
and foreign origins. Taking advantage of this particular
route network structure, we estimate the fare differences
between domestic- and foreign-originating trips to in-
tercontinental destinations that share the same main,
intercontinental, flight leg. This allows us to answer the
question whether airlines (e.g., Air France) charge higher
fares for domestic-originating trips (e.g., Nice–Paris–
New York) compared with highly equivalent foreign-
originating trips (e.g., Turin–Paris–New York).
To disentangle the domestic country premium from
the airport dominance premium, wematch the fare data
with data on the airlines’ share of the total scheduled
departing seats at each origin airport in our data. As
detailed in a later section, we argue that this measure
of airport dominance is exogenous to the route-level fares
in our fare data, because the number of scheduled
departing seats is typically determined well in advance
and is defined at the airport level. We estimate reduced-
form fare regressions with main flight leg fixed effects,
trip characteristics, an indicator for domestic origins,
and the measure for airport dominance. To further iso-
late the domestic country premium, we explicitly control
for the level of competition on the markets and a wide
range of origin airport and demand characteristics known
or suspected to affect fare levels.
We report three main findings. First, fares for trips
originating in the airlines’ domestic airports are ap-
proximately 9% more expensive than fares for virtually
identical trips that originate in foreign airports, even
after adding the aforementioned controls. Second, in the
international airline markets considered in our analysis,
the domestic country premium seems to prevail over the
traditional airport dominance premium. Specifically, the
domestic country premium approximates the premium
an airline would be able to charge after an approxi-
mately 60% point increase in its airport-specific market
share. Third, the domestic country premium is three
times as large on trips without a Saturday-night stayover
relative to trips with a Saturday-night stayover—18%
versus 6%, which suggests that the premium applies in
particular to the domestic business travel segment and
corroborates amarket power interpretation of thefindings.
Although it has been known that airlines engage in
international price discrimination (see, e.g., Bachis and
Piga 2011), our analysis is the first to document that
airlines charge a substantial premium over average fares
for trips originating in their domestic country. Our
findings suggest that, despite substantial deregulation
of the international airline industry, airlines have a
de Jong et al.: Domestic Market Power of Airlines
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higher degree of market power on routes that orig-
inate in their domestic country relative to routes that
originate in foreign countries. Although a welfare as-
sessment of this effect is beyond the scope of this paper,
a key implication of our analysis is that domestic market
power represents a substantial barrier for international
airline industries to reach perfect competitiveness. An-
other major implication of our analysis is that, in inter-
national airline industries, a decrease in an airline’s
market share at one of its domestic airports would do
little harm to the market power of this airline. This
represents a crucial difference with domestic airline in-
dustries, where a distinction between domestic and
foreign airlines is not applicable and policy making has
been predominantly concerned with airline market
power at dominated airports (see e.g., the AIR-21 leg-
islation in the U.S. airline industry, described and eval-
uated by Snider and Williams 2015).
Existing insights on airline market power are pre-
dominantly established indomestic airline industries.Our
findings demonstrate that these insights are not always
directly transferable to an international context. To gain a
more comprehensive understanding of competition be-
tween domestic and foreign airlines, more research that
addresses the particular institutional, geographic, and cul-
tural aspects of international airline markets is warranted.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our
identification strategy. Section 3 provides a description
of the data and preliminary evidence. Section 4 discusses
the empirical analysis and findings. Section 5 concludes.
2. Identification Strategy
To estimate the premium over average fares that airlines
command on trips from and to their domestic country,
we set out a novel identification strategy that relies
on the route network structures of European airlines.
Consider a stylized display of such a route network
in Figure 1. The airline provides services to destination
A, via its hub H, from a set of domestic airports D 
{D1,D2} and foreign airports F  {F1,F2,F3}. Our iden-
tification strategy focuses on the question whether this
airline charges higher fares, other things equal, for the
flights leaving from the domestic airports D compared
with those leaving from the foreign airports F.
We exploit the fact that seats on flights from hub H
to destinationA are offered bothwith seats on domestic-
originating feeder flights as well as foreign-originating
feeder flights, while the fares are defined on the origin–
destination level. Thus, a domestic and a foreign-
originating traveler that share the same airplane for
the vast majority of their trip, potentially face com-
pletely different fares. By comparing the fares charged
to these two groups of travelers, while keeping fixed other
ticket characteristics such as the type of seat and number
of days booked in advance, we isolate the domestic
country premium. Simultaneously, we use variation in
airport-specific airline market shares, the number and
identity of the competitors on the origin–destination
market, and origin airport and catchment area charac-
teristics, to disentangle the domestic country premium
from the effects of airport dominance, competition, and
demand characteristics, respectively.
To clarify our choice for this identification strategy,
we briefly discuss some advantages over other can-
didate strategies. For instance, one might consider to
identify the domestic country premium by estimating
the fare differential between domestic and foreign air-
lines serving the same markets (i.e., an interairline com-
parison strategy instead of our intra-airline comparison
strategy). Nevertheless, it is key to note that the major-
ity of the nonstop markets with presence of both do-
mestic and foreign airlines are operated from and to
strongly dominated (hub) airports. An interairline com-
parison on nonstop markets would therefore perfectly
confound the domestic country premium with the air-
port dominance effect. Alternatively, one could consider
an interairline comparison on one-stop markets. How-
ever, this becomes problematic because airlines serving
the same market are not necessarily serving the same
routes, introducing substantial noise to the estimation
(e.g., different hubs and levels of detour). Instead, our
identification strategy enables us to empirically separate
the domestic country premium from the airport domi-
nance premium and at the same time ensures the com-
parability of the domestic- and foreign-originating trips
owing to the identical main flight leg.
3. Data
Our data consist of published fares for return trip air
travel in an eight-week period covering February, March,
and April 2016, offered by two European airlines: Air
France andLufthansa. These airlines are two of the largest
airlines in Europe and represent the distinct domestic
airline brand in their domestic country. The fares are
recovered from the booking pages of the airline websites.
Besides fares, we obtain general flight information, such
as the departure and arrival times and operating airlines.
The fare data are further augmented with information on
origin airport characteristics (e.g., airline market shares,
Figure 1. Stylized Route Network of a European Airline
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airport size), regional statistics on the origin catchment
area, and data on the number and identity of the com-
peting airlines on the origin–destination markets.
3.1. Primary Data
The fare data cover 72 European origins and four
non-European destinations, resulting in 288 origin–
destination markets (Table 1). The number of origins
and destinations is the result of a trade-off between the
desire to capture a broad and varied range of markets
and the need to keep the data collection at a manageable
level. Specifically, the destinations are geographically
dispersed and represent four of the most economically
relevant intercontinental destinations from a European
perspective. The set of origins contains all airports
with more than 1 million travelers in 2014, that are
either located in France or Germany or within the
750-km radius of one of the main hubs of Air France
(i.e., Paris) or Lufthansa (i.e., Frankfurt and Munich).
The latter ensures that domestic- and foreign-originating
trips are of roughly similar distance and that all trips
originate in the geographic region of Mid-Western
Europe; see Figure 2. Given that our identification
strategy relies on fares for one-stop connecting travel,
the hubs of Air France and Lufthansa are omitted. In
the remaining origin–destination markets the airlines
do not operate nonstop services.
For each airline and origin–destination market com-
bination, we collect the available fares from the airlines’
websites for four distinct trips that vary according to the
number of days until departure, 56 or seven days, and
the length-of-stay at the destination, four or 10 days
(i.e., the number of days between the outbound and the
returnflight). Variation on these dimensions permits us to
investigate the differential impact of the domestic country
premiumon trips booked long or shortly before departure,
tripswith a short or longer stay at the destination and trips
with or without a Saturday-night stayover.
All aforementioned data dimensions are listed in
Table 1. Combining these dimensions, we arrive at
2 (airlines) × 4 (destinations)× 72 (origins) × 2 (booking
day categories) × 2 (length-of-stay categories) = 2,304
distinct trips. These trips are distributed over the eight-
week period between February 8 and April 3, 2016, so
that each trip is assigned a specific departure date
within this period. This results in a schedule that gov-
erns at what day to collect the fare data for which trips
(see the online appendix for further details). Following
this schedule, we collect the fares and flight informa-
tion for all outbound and return flights that are avail-
able for a given trip.
For some trips there were no available flights (e.g.,
owing to missing links in the networks of the airlines).
From the remaining trips, we select the trips with avail-
able one-stop outbound and returnflights, with stopovers
at a main hub of the ticketing airline. Note that this is
a prerequisite for our identification strategy and effec-
tively means that we do not use trips for which the only
available flights are multistop flights or one-stop flights
through a partner’s hub. To further ensure the compa-
rability of the trips in our data, we apply four additional
criteria.3 First, we select all flights where the main flight
leg is operated by Air France or Lufthansa. This prevents
that service quality differences among partner airlines
obscure the calculated fare differentials. We do, however,
allow for tickets where the feeder leg is operated by
a (regional) partner (e.g., Swiss operating the feeder leg for
a one-stop flight offered by Lufthansa), because this is
a common practice in the airline industry andwould lead
to many trips without available flights.4 Second, we
remove all rail–air and bus–air connections to ensure
included observations represent pure air fares only. Third,
Table 1. Fare Data Collection Dimensions
Dimension Instances
Airlines (2) Air France (AF), Lufthansa (LH)
Destinations (4) Sao-Paolo (GRU), New-York (JFK), Los-Angeles (LAX), Shanghai (PVG)
Origins (72) Amsterdam (AMS), Milan Bergamo (BGY), Birmingham (BHX), Bastia (BIA), Biarritz (BIQ), Billund
(BLL), Bologna (BLQ), Bordeaux (BOD), Bremen (BRE), Bristol (BRS), Brussels (BRU), Basel (BSL),
Bratislava (BTS), Cologne Bonn (CGN), Copenhagen (CPH), Brussels Charleroi (CRL), Cardiff (CWL),
Dresden (DRS), Dortmund (DTM), Düsseldorf (DUS), Eindhoven (EIN), East Midlands (EMA),
Florence (FLR), Genoa (GOA), Geneva (GVA), Hannover (HAJ), Hamburg (HAM), Hahn (HHN),
Jersey (JER), Leeds Bradford (LBA), London City (LCY), Leipzig/Halle (LEJ), LondonGatwick (LGW),
London Heathrow (LHR), Lille (LIL), Milan Linate (LIN), Ljubljana (LJU), Liverpool (LPL), London
Luton (LTN), Luxembourg (LUX), Lyon (LYS), Manchester (MAN), Malmo (MMX), Montpellier
(MPL),Marseille (MRS),MilanMalpensa (MXP), Nice (NCE), Newcastle (NCL),Weeze (NRN), Nantes
(NTE), Nurnberg (NUE), Poznan (POZ), Prague (PRG), Pisa (PSA), Rotterdam (RTM), London
Southend (SEN), Southampton (SOU), London Stansted (STN), Stuttgart (STR), Strasbourg (SXB),
Berlin Schonefeld (SXF), Salzburg (SZG), Toulouse (TLS), Turin (TRN), Treviso (TSF), Berlin Tegel
(TXL), Venice Marco Polo (VCE), Vienna (VIE), Verona (VRN), Wroclaw (WRO), Zagreb (ZAG),
Zurich (ZRH)
Booking days (2) 56 days (early-book), seven days (late-book)
Length-of-stay (2) 10 days (long-stay), four days (short-stay)
de Jong et al.: Domestic Market Power of Airlines
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wedrop allflights that include an airport transfer.5 Flights
involving an airport transfer convey additional time and
monetary costs on the traveler and are therefore diffi-
cult to compare with flights without an airport transfer.
Fourth, we only keep flights with a layover time of less
than six hours. This excludes, among others, flights that
include an overnight stay at the hub.
The final fare data set contains 1,067 trips that satisfy
the above criteria. The last step in constructing our fare
data is the selection of an outbound and return flight
combination for each of these trips. Within each trip, we
select the outbound and the return flights with the lowest
fare. In case the fares of two or more flights are equal,
the flight with the lowest journey time is selected.
3.2. Secondary Data
The fare data are augmented with data from four
additional sources. First, we retrieve an extensive range
of origin airport characteristics from the Official Airline
Guide (OAG 2018). For our purposes, the most im-
portant information is the airline market shares at each
origin airport in our fare data.6 To assess the potentially
different impacts of airline and alliance market share,
we calculate both the share of departing seats operated
by the airline or one of its affiliates (i.e., subsidiary
airlines in which the major airline owns a majority
stake) and the share of departing seats operated by the
airline or one its alliance partners and their respective
affiliates. These data further characterize each origin
airport in terms of number of seats and destinations,
type of destinations (i.e., short-, medium-, or long-haul),
share of business seats, and the distance to the hub.7
Second, we collect information on airport-level ca-
pacity constraints from the International Air Transport
Association (IATA 2016). These data list all airports that
need to be slot-coordinated because they operate at full
or close to full capacity. We use this information to
construct an indicator for capacity-constrained airports.
Third, we collect the most recent data on population
and gross domestic product per capita of each origin
airport’s catchment area from Eurostat (Eurostat 2016).
In linewith studies on airport catchment areas in Europe
(e.g., Maertens 2012), we model the airport catchment
areas as the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Sta-
tistics (NUTS) 3 regions whose geographic midpoints
are within the 100-km radius of the airport. The origin
catchment population is equal to the sum of the pop-
ulation of all NUTS 3 regions within the origin airport’s
catchment area. Likewise, the origin gross domestic
product per inhabitant is the weighted average of the
Figure 2. Map of Sampled European Origin Airports
de Jong et al.: Domestic Market Power of Airlines
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gross domestic product per inhabitant of each relevant
NUTS 3 region.
Fourth, we manually collect information on the com-
peting airlines in each of the markets in our data by
consulting the ITA Matrix (ITA Software 2016). The
number of competitors on a given market is defined as
the number of noncooperating airlines operating flights
on thatmarket. Thus, airlines within the same alliance or
codesharing agreement are regardedas a single competitor.
3.3. Descriptive Statistics
The 1,067 trips in our data relate to 49 origins, 4 des-
tinations, and 187 origin–destination markets.8 Of these
trips, 258 are domestic-originating ( ≈ 24%) and 809
are foreign-originating ( ≈ 76%). Table 2 provides
descriptive statistics for the total data and these two
subgroups.
The mean fare in the data is 964 euro. The domestic-
originating trips are priced higher, on average, than
the foreign-originating trips. Not surprisingly, both the
airline and alliance market shares are higher at domestic
airports. The average domestic airport market share of
the airlines and alliances is 47% and 51% respectively,
versus 13% and 23% at foreign airports.
The average round-trip flight time in the data is 24
hours, and the domestic- and foreign-originating flight
times tend to coincide owing to the identical main flight
legs, which constitute themajority of the total flight time.
The domestic-originating trips, however, are char-
acterized by shorter feeder flight leg lengths. Further,
the ratios of late- or early-booked trips (1 = early; 0 =
late), short- or long-stay trips (1 = short; 0 = late), and
trips including or excluding a Saturday-night stay-
over (1 = including; 0 = excluding) are more or less
evenly distributed over the domestic- and foreign-
originating trips.
The summary statistics furthermore show that air-
lines face slightly less competition in domestic relative
to foreign-originating markets. This holds for both the
number of competitors and the number of markets in
which a nonstop service is present. The foreign-origin
airports tend to serve a larger number of seats and
destinations, are characterized by a higher share of
business seats, and are more likely to be capacity con-
strained. Nevertheless, given the large standard de-
viations, there is substantial variation within the sets of
domestic and foreign airports in the aforementioned
airport characteristics. Finally, in terms of the average
population and gross domestic product per capita, the
domestic and foreign origins are very similar.
3.4. Preliminary Evidence
To further explore the patterns in our data, we provide
several data visualizations.9 Figures 3 and 4 show the
distributions of domestic- and foreign-originating fares
by airline and destination, respectively. The dashed curve
represents the domestic-originating fares, whereas the
solid curve represents the foreign-originating fares.
The means of the two distributions are depicted by the
dashed and solid vertical lines, respectively. Congruent
Table 2. Descriptives of Total Sample and Domestic and Foreign-Originating Subsamples
Variable
Total sample Domestic-originating Foreign-originating
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Main variables
Fare (euro) 963.977 384.852 1083.178 440.445 925.962 357.376
Domestic origin (1/0) 0.242 0.428 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Market shareairline(%) 21.514 19.840 47.213 13.948 13.318 13.389
Market sharealliance(%) 29.859 22.274 50.733 13.540 23.203 20.316
Trip characteristics
Flight time (hours) 24.056 3.146 23.717 3.100 24.164 3.155
Feeder leg length (km) 1,126.591 420.387 869.795 312.348 1,208.487 417.555
Late book (0/1) 0.480 0.500 0.484 0.501 0.478 0.500
Short stay (0/1) 0.491 0.500 0.488 0.501 0.492 0.500
Saturday-night stayover (0/1) 0.721 0.449 0.721 0.449 0.721 0.449
Competitive environment
Competitors (no.) 2.580 1.216 2.062 1.142 2.745 1.193
Nonstop (1/0) 0.207 0.424 0.078 0.268 0.248 0.455
Origin characteristics
Seats (no.) 664.344 764.137 423.035 322.739 741.301 844.214
Destinations (no.) 77.464 47.953 59.422 31.859 83.218 50.733
Long-haul airport (0/1) 0.648 0.478 0.581 0.494 0.669 0.471
Share of business seats (%) 8.244 5.422 7.092 2.848 8.611 5.971
Capacity constrained (0/1) 0.891 0.311 0.787 0.410 0.925 0.264
Population (millions) 6.920 4.466 6.365 4.462 7.097 4.456
Gross domestic product per capita (thousands) 33.046 8.503 32.288 4.596 33.288 9.404
Note. Units of measurement given in parentheses.
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with the descriptives, the figures show that domestic-
originating trips are generally more expensive. Impor-
tantly, this pattern is persistent across the two airlines
and the four destinations. In terms of destinations, it is
worth noting that the fare difference is especially prev-
alent for trips to Shanghai. The most striking insight,
however, is that the distributions of the domestic-
originating fares are roughly bimodal, whereas the
foreign-originating fares approximate unimodal distri-
butions. This pattern is consistent with an underlying
interaction effect between the indicator for domestic-
originating trips on the one hand, and a binary variable
such as the indicators for booking days, length-of-stay,
or Saturday-night stayovers on the other hand.
In Figures 5–7, we further explore the bimodality of
the domestic-originating fare distributions by plotting
domestic versus foreign-originating fares on subsets cre-
ated by splitting the data by the aforementioned binary
indicators. Figure 5 presents the most interesting of these
figures, depicting the distribution of domestic- and
foreign-originating fares for trips with and without
a Saturday-night stayover separately.10 The patterns
strongly suggest that the bimodality of domestic-
originating fare distributions is caused by an interaction
between domestic-originating trips and trips without
a Saturday-night stayover. More specifically, although
domestic-originating trips are priced higher in general,
the difference between domestic- and foreign-originating
trips is vastly more profound in the subset containing
only the trips without a Saturday-night stayover. Given
that trips without a Saturday-night stayover are predom-
inantly bought by business travelers (see, e.g., Stavins
2001), this suggests that the domestic country premium
applies in particular to the business travel segment.
An obvious drawback of the figures provided so far is
that they do not disentangle the fare impact of originating
from an airline’s domestic country from the fare impact
that can be attributed to airport dominance. Therefore,
Figure 8 shows the association between fares and air-
port dominance in the subsets of domestic- and foreign-
originating trips. As discussed, the airport dominance can
be defined as market share of the airline (left panel) or
Figure 3. Domestic-Originating (Dashed Line) vs. Foreign-Originating (Solid Line) Fares by Airline
Figure 4. Domestic-Originating (Dashed Line) vs. Foreign-Originating (Solid Line) Fares by Destination
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market share of the alliance (right panel). The associations
shown are trend lines based on a simple linear regression
of the underlying price and market share observa-
tions in each of the subsets. The 90% confidence intervals
around the slopes of the trend lines are depicted by
the shaded areas. The dashed line represents the asso-
ciation between fares and market shares for the subset
of domestic-originating trips, whereas the solid line
represents this association for the subset of foreign-
originating trips.
These figures portray a main premise of this paper:
given an airport-specific airline or alliance market share,
airlines charge higher fares for domestic-originating trips
compared with their foreign-originating counterparts. In
the following section, we turn to the econometric analysis
of this effect, to account for other potential confounding




In line with our identification strategy, we use reduced-
form fare regressions with main flight leg fixed effects.
Note that within main flight legs the airline and desti-
nation are given, therefore heterogeneity from these
sources will be captured by the fixed effects. To identify
the domestic country premium, the specification includes
a dummy variable indicating whether the trip originates
from a domestic origin airport. We then use variation in
the airline market shares at the origin airports to sepa-
rate the domestic country premium from the airport
dominance premium. In addition, we control for trip,
origin airport and demand characteristics, and the com-
petitive environment in the origin–destination market.
The trip characteristics include indicators for booking
days, length of stay, and Saturday-night stayovers, as
well as the feeder leg length to capture the fare impact of
flight distance (see, e.g., Hotle et al. 2015).11 The origin
airport characteristics include the number of seats and
destinations served from the airport, share of business
seats, an indicator for whether there are long-haul ser-
vices departing from the airport, and an indicator for
whether the airport is capacity constrained. These vari-
ables control for, among others, the potential fare impact
of different types of origin airports (Hess 2010) and air-
port capacity constraints (Ciliberto andWilliams 2010). In
addition, we follow Van Dender (2007), Brueckner, Lee,
and Singer (2013), and Bilotkach and Lakew (2014) in
controlling for origin demand and willingness-to-pay
by the origin catchment area population andgross domestic
product. Finally, we include two competition controls
that capture the competitive environment in the origin–
destination market. In line with Brueckner, Lee, and
Singer (2013), we control for the competitive environment
by using competitor counts.12 Moreover, we include
an indicator for whether nonstop alternatives are being
offered in the market.
Thus, we measure average fare differences between
domestic- and foreign-originating trips that have identical
main flight legs and are equal in terms of booking
days, length of stay, and Saturday-night stayover while
explicitly controlling for feeder flight length, origin
Figure 5. Domestic-Originating (Dashed Line) vs. Foreign-Originating (Solid Line) Fares by Saturday-Night Stayover
Figure 6. Domestic-Originating (Dashed Line) vs. Foreign-Originating (Solid Line) Fares by Booking Days Until Departure
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airport and demand characteristics, and the compet-
itive environment in the origin–destination market.13
The accompanying baseline model specification is as
follows:
ln Fijmod  γDjo + θMjo + ωzi + λxo + ηwod + δm+εijmod,
(1)
where ln Fijmod is the natural log of the fare on trip i,
offered by airline j, operating main flight leg m, from
origin o to destination d. The indicator variable for
domestic origins Djo is defined as follows:
Djo 
1, if origin airport o is in the domestic




The variable Mjo is a measure of the market share of
airline j on origin airport o. The vectors zi, xo, and wod
respectively capture characteristics of trip i, airport
and demand characteristics at origin o, and the com-
petitive environment in the origin–destination market
od, as discussed above. The main flight leg fixed effect
is denoted by δm and the random error term by εijmod.
The main parameters of interest are γ and θ. The
parameter γ provides an estimate of the domestic country
premium (i.e., the percentage fare differential between
trips that depart from domestic airports and those that
depart from foreign airports), whereas θ provides an
estimate of the airport dominance premium (i.e., the per-
centage fare impact of one additional percent point
market share at the origin airport).
To account for the interaction between domestic
country and Saturday-night stayover effects, we specify
the following interaction model:
ln Fijmod  γ1[Djo · (1 − Si)] + γ2[Djo ·Si]
+θ1[Mjo · (1 − Si)] + θ2[Mjo ·Si]
+ωzi + λxo + ηwod + δm+εijmod,
(2)
where Si is an indicator for trips that include
a Saturday-night stayover, defined as follows:
Si 





Here, γ1 provides the domestic country premium for trips
without a Saturday-night stayover,whereasγ2 denotes this
premiumfor tripswithaSaturday-night stayover. Similarly,
θ1 and θ2 indicate the airport dominance premiumon trips
without and with a Saturday-night stayover, respectively.
A potential econometric concern with our model
specifications is the endogeneity of the market share
measures. However, it is important to note that we cal-
culate market shares according the number of sched-
uled seats. These are directly related to the number of
scheduled flights and aircraft type, which in the airline
industry are typically determinedwell in advance. Thus,
our market share measures resemble the lagged en-
dogenous instruments frequently used in the aviation
economics literature to avoid simultaneity bias (i.e., the
current fare level is not likely to affect the schedulemade
Figure 7. Domestic-Originating (Dashed Line) vs. Foreign-Originating (Solid Line) Fares by Length of Stay at Destination
Figure 8. Association Between Domestic-Originating (Dashed Line) and Foreign-Originating (Solid line) Fares and Market
Shares
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months ago) and diminish the potential for omitted
variable bias (see, e.g., Greenfield 2014). Moreover,
given that the market shares are defined at the airport
level, inconsistent estimates only arise in case of omitted
variables that affect the airline’s aggregate market share
at the origin airport. For these reasons, we conjecture
the costs of an adjustment (e.g., using an instrumental
variable approach) to be worse than the conceivably
limited impact of endogeneity.
4.2. Estimation Results
Table 3 shows the estimation results of variations on the
baseline model, as specified in Equation (1). The table
reports the coefficient estimates on the domestic origin
indicator and market share measures, with their cor-
responding standard errors in parentheses. Because these
key independent variables vary on the origin-airline level,
we allow standard errors to be correlated within origin-
airline clusters. Intuitively, this adjusts the standard
errors for the fact that additional observations in the
same cluster do not provide completely independent
pieces of information.14
Column (1) in Table 3 provides the results of a simple
model, regressing the natural log of fares on the do-
mestic origin indicator, main flight leg fixed effects, and
trip characteristics. The coefficient on the domestic ori-
gin indicator is equal to 0.1414, which reflects a domestic
country premium of approximately 14%. To control for
airport dominance, we add the airport-specific market
shares on the airline and the alliance levels in columns (2)
and (3), respectively. The airline market share sub-
stantially reduces the fare differential between domestic-
and foreign-originating trips to approximately 9.5%.
Although the direct effect of airport dominance on fares
is small, the impact on the domestic country premium
demonstrates the importance of disentangling the airport
dominance effect.15 On the other hand, significant effects
for airport-specific market shares do not arise when
market shares are defined on the alliance level, as re-
ported in column (3). Thus, although airlines are able
to raise fares at airports where they serve a large share
of the market, we do not find evidence of an umbrella
effect at airports where their alliance partners are
dominant.
In addition to the airport-specific market shares at
the airline level, columns (4) and (5) respectively add
the set of controls for the competitive environment
and origin characteristics as discussed in the previous
section. The estimates of the domestic country pre-
mium remain virtually identical to the model without
these additional controls. This provides confidence that
the coefficient on the domestic origin indicator captures
something specifically related to domestic-originating
markets allowing the airline to charge higher prices,
which cannot be captured by conventional controls for
the competitive environment and origin airport and
demand characteristics.16
Table 4 shows the estimation results of variations of the
interaction model in Equation (2). The table reports the
estimates of the domestic country and airport dominance
premiums for trips with and without Saturday-night
stayover separately. Similar to the baseline models,
cluster-robust standard errors with clustering at the
origin-airline level are given in parentheses.
Column (1) in Table 4 shows the results of a model in
which the regressors consist of main flight leg fixed
effects, the trip characteristics (i.e., including a general
Saturday-night stayover indicator), and the interactions
between the domestic origin and Saturday-night stay-
over indicators. The coefficient on the indicator for
Table 3. Baseline Model Estimation Results
Dependent variable: lnFare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Domestic origin 0.1414*** 0.0948*** 0.1352*** 0.0968*** 0.0885***
(0.0212) (0.0322) (0.0333) (0.0307) (0.0324)




Main flight leg fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trip characteristics controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Competitive environment controls No No No Yes Yes
Origin characteristics controls No No No No Yes
Observations 1,067 1,067 1,067 1,067 1,067
Adjusted R2 0.5100 0.5121 0.5097 0.5137 0.5166
Note. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
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domestic-originating trips without a Saturday-night
stayover equals 0.3103. In other words, domestic-
originating trips that do not include a Saturday-night
stayover are approximately 31% more expensive rela-
tive to foreign-originating trips that also do not include
Saturday-night stayover. In comparison, the point esti-
mate of the domestic country premium on trips with a
Saturday-night stayover of 0.0775 suggests that domestic-
originating trips that include a Saturday-night stayover
are only approximately 7.8% more expensive than
foreign-originating trips that include a Saturday-night
stayover. Hence, the model estimates confirm our ob-
servation from the data visualizations that the domestic
country premium is vastly more profound on trips
without a Saturday-night stayover.
Column (2) in Table 4 includes the airport-specific
airline market shares, interacted with the Saturday-
night stayover. The coefficients on these market share
measures suggest that the fare impact of airport domi-
nance is statistically and economically relevant on trips
excluding a Saturday-night stayover but not on trips
including a Saturday-night stayover. As is the case in our
baseline models, controlling for the airport dominance
effect substantially reduces the domestic country pre-
miums. Specifically, our estimate of the domestic country
fare premiumon tripswithout a Saturday-night stayover
decreases from 31.0% to 18.8%, whereas the premium on
tripswith a Saturday-night stayover decreases from 7.8%
to 6.4% and is no longer statistically significant at con-
ventional significance levels.17 Including the set of
competition and origin controls, as is done in columns (3)
and (4), does not substantially alter these findings.
The model estimation results offer the following
three main takeaways. First, international trips to
and from domestic origin airports are characterized by
substantially higher fares relative to comparable trips
originating in foreign airports, even after controlling
for airport dominance, the competitive environment, and
a wide range of origin airport and demand characteris-
tics. Second, the domestic country premium seems to
prevail over the traditional airport dominance premium
in the international air transport markets considered
here. While controlling for airport-specific airline market
share, we find an average domestic country fare pre-
mium of 8.8%–9.5% (depending on additional controls).
In comparison, this premium is approximately equal to
the premium an airline would be able to charge after
a 54%–64%-point increase in its airport-specific market
share. Third, the domestic country premium on trips
without a Saturday-night stayover—approximately
18%—is three times as large as the domestic country
premium on trips that do not involve a Saturday-night
stayover—approximately 6%. Hence, in line with results
from the airport dominance literature (e.g., Lee and
Luengo-Prado 2005), the domestic country premium
seems to apply in particular to travelers flying for
business purposes.
4.3. Robustness Checks
Table 5 reports various sensitivity analyses that explore
the robustness of our interaction model estimates. All
models include as regressors the interactions of the
domestic origin indicator and airport-specific airline
market share with the Saturday-night stayover indi-
cators, as well as the full range of trip characteristics,
competition, and origin controls.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 report the results of
twomodels with alternative fixed effects specifications.
In column (1) the fixed effects are defined as the com-
bination of the outbound and return main leg flight
Table 4. Interaction Model Estimation Results
Dependent variable: lnFare
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Domestic originno Saturday − night 0.3103*** 0.1882*** 0.1899*** 0.1810***
(0.0365) (0.0434) (0.0433) (0.0469)
Domestic originSaturday − night 0.0775*** 0.0635* 0.0658** 0.0541
(0.0223) (0.0346) (0.0330) (0.0342)
Market shareairlinenoSaturday−night 0.0040*** 0.0039*** 0.0040***
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Market shareairlineSaturday−night 0.0005 0.0005 0.0007
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Main flight leg fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trip characteristics controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Competitive environment controls No No Yes Yes
Origin characteristics controls No No No Yes
Observations 1,067 1,067 1,067 1,067
Adjusted R2 0.5231 0.5286 0.5300 0.5324
Note. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
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numbers. Trips operated under the same flight number
are likely to have similar unobservable characteristics,
such as, for example, departure and arrival times, and
type of aircraft. Hence this specification controls ex-
plicitly for such unobservable heterogeneity that, if
not randomly distributed across domestic- and foreign-
originating trips, might confound our estimates. In
column (2) we use flight date fixed effects in addition
to the regular main flight leg fixed effects. These flight
date fixed effects control for any unobservable fare trend
or day-of-the-week effect. The estimates of the domestic
country and airport dominance premiums provided by
these alternative fixed effects specifications are in line
with the estimates provided by the main flight leg fixed
effects specifications reported in Table 4. The point es-
timates of the domestic country premium are virtually
the same using the main leg flight number fixed effects,
and slightly larger using the combination of main flight
leg and flight dates fixed effects. However, in both cases
the point estimates are well within the 95 confidence
interval of the reported premium in column (4) of
Table 4, suggesting that any bias due to unobservable
heterogeneity across flight numbers and booking and
flying dates does not impact substantially the estimated
parameters of interest. Hence, these results do not
warrant altering our fixed effects specification and we
continue—in line with our identification strategy—with
the main flight leg fixed effects.
As mentioned in the discussion about the collection
of fare data, we applied a number of criteria to ensure
the comparability of the trips in our data. To check
whether our estimates are sensitive to these criteria,
we estimate the preferred interaction model from col-
umn (4) in Table 4 on samples in which we do not
enforce these restrictions. In column (3) of Table 5 we
report the results on a sample including potential feeder
flights that are operated by bus or rail. Hence, if for
certain trips airlines offer a rail–air or bus–air alternative
that has a lower fare than the lowest priced air–air al-
ternative, this alternative is included in our final sample.
Similarly, we allow flights with a layover time of more
than six hours in column (4) of Table 5 anddo not exclude
trips that involve an airport transfer in column (5). Al-
though fewer restrictions imply a larger sample size, the
obvious disadvantage is that the trip observations are
less comparable. Nonetheless, the results on these al-
ternative samples provided in columns (3), (4), and (5)
are not dramatically different from the estimates reported
in column (4) of Table 4. Most notably, the coefficients
of the domestic country premium are somewhat smaller
and no longer statistically significant for trips with a
Saturday-night stayover in the samples allowing for
bus and rail feeder flights and airport transfers. This
likely arises because both bus and rail feeder flights and
airport transfers are typically lower priced and, at the
same time, more common in domestic-originating mar-
kets, which causes downward pressure on domestic-
originating fares.
Finally, we use a very strict way of controlling for
systematic differences in feeder flight length between
domestic and foreign origins by restricting the data
based on a certain bandwidth feeder flight length.
Table 5. Robustness Checks for Interaction Model Estimation Results
Dependent variable: lnFare
Alternative fixed effects Alternative sample selection criteria
Feeder flight length
subsets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Domestic originnoSaturday−night 0.1729*** 0.2072*** 0.1875*** 0.1879*** 0.1561*** 0.2048*** 0.2262***
(0.0496) (0.0482) (0.0462) (0.0457) (0.0454) (0.0436) (0.0606)
Domestic originSaturday−night 0.0361 0.0670* 0.0375 0.0676** 0.0424 0.0486 0.0620*
(0.0325) (0.0352) (0.0352) (0.0343) (0.0315) (0.0350) (0.0333)
Market shareairlinenoSaturday−night 0.0041*** 0.0037*** 0.0040*** 0.0040*** 0.0036*** 0.0037*** 0.0034**
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0014)
Market shareairlineSaturday−night 0.0008 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0004 0.0010 0.0013*
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Main flight leg fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Main flight number fixed effect Yes No No No No No No
Flight dates fixed effect No Yes No No No No No
Trip characteristics controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Competitive environment controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin characteristics controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,067 1,067 1,121 1,139 1,109 826 508
Adjusted R2 0.5584 0.7029 0.5219 0.5215 0.5411 0.5688 0.5925
Note. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
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Specifically, column (6) of Table 5 restricts the data to
only include a trip if it is operated from an origin
airport within 500 and 1,500 km of the hub used in that
trip, whereas column (7) further restricts this bandwidth
to 750 and 1,250 km. Thus, this substantially increases the
comparability of domestic- and foreign-originating trips in
terms of feeder flight length. Reassuringly, the magnitude
of the domestic country premium in these subsets is in
line with the estimates obtained on the full sample
of origins. If anything, the domestic country premium
becomes somewhat larger in these specifications.
In general, our results are robust with respect to
various fixed effects specifications, the criteria used in
the data collection, and subsets of the data based on
feeder flight length. Although the domestic country
premium on trips with a Saturday-night stayover is
somewhatmore sensitive, themagnitude of thepremiums
remains within the same order of magnitude—between
15.6% and 22.6% for trips without a Saturday-night
stayover and between 3.6% and 6.7% for trips with
a Saturday-night stayover.
4.4. Discussion
The key takeaway from the preceding sections is that
airlines charge a fare premium inmarkets that originate
in their domestic country. This premium brings about
substantial fare differences between virtually identical
domestic- and foreign-originating trips and, importantly,
emerges independently of the airport dominance ef-
fect, the level of competition on the market, and origin
airport and demand characteristics. We therefore inter-
pret these findings as a manifestation of the relative
market power of airlines at domestic airports vis-á-vis
foreign airports. It is worth stressing that our results
should be interpreted as relative effects. That is, the fare
differences reflect the ability of airlines to convert
competitive advantages in their domestic country into
higher fares and increased profits, and at the same time
echo that airlines need to use a foreign discount to at-
tract foreign travelers.18
We also find some evidence of the airport dominance
effect in our data, although the magnitude of the effect
on fare levels is relatively small. This implies that market
power in international airline industries is largely in-
dependent of the airlines’ market share at the origin
endpoint. Instead, the distinction between domestic
and foreign origins becomes crucial in determining
the degree of market power that airlines have. Con-
sequently, an airline is nearly just as able to charge
a premium on trips departing from a domestic airport
where it has a relatively low market share versus trips
from a domestic airport where it has a clearly dominant
position. In the same vein, a decrease in an airline’s
market share at one of its domestic airports wouldmake
little difference to the fare premium that this airline
is able to command in the international markets con-
nected to that airport.
The finding of differential premiums for trips with
and without a Saturday-night stayover rules out that
cost differences between the markets are responsible
for the fare patterns in our data, and is therefore con-
sistent with our market power interpretation. The higher
premium for trips without a Saturday-night stayover
conceivably arises because those trips are targeted at
business travelers (see, e.g., Stavins 2001). Although lei-
sure and business travelers may both prefer their do-
mestic airline, the latter are generally assumed to be less
price sensitive and therefore might be willing to pay
a higher premium. An alternative line of reasoning holds
that because of their higher opportunity costs of time,
business travelers are less likely to take the effort of
searching for lower fares (Bachis and Piga 2011). Finally,
business travelers aremore likely to be active participants
in frequent flier programs and may therefore attach a
greater value to the miles of the domestic airline.
In our view, it is, nevertheless, unlikely that frequent
flier programs drive the entire domestic country pre-
mium that is identified in our analysis. Foremost, our
analysis focuses on the lowest available fares that qualify
for the lowest proportional miles accrual, and in turn, are
not likely to be bought by travelers who strongly value
frequent flier miles.19 Moreover, back-of-the-envelope
calculations suggest that our estimates of the domestic
country premium are large relative to the implied price
subsidy of frequent flier miles.20 Finally, we also find
some evidence of the domestic country premiums on
trips that include a Saturday-night stayover. These flights
are typically bought by leisure travelers, for whom fre-
quent flier programs are not likely to play a major role.
In sum, besides the ability to raise fares through
frequent flier programs, our analysis suggests that ad-
ditional competitive advantages enjoyed by airlines in
their domestic country are likely to play a role in sus-
taining their ability to charge higher fares for domestic-
originating travel.
5. Conclusion
Our analysis shows that airlines charge a substantial
premium of approximately 9% over average fares on
trips that originate in domestic airports relative to com-
parable trips that originate in foreign airports. Impor-
tantly, we conceptually and empirically distinguish this
domestic country premium from the airport dominance
premium and find the former to prevail in the inter-
national airline markets studied in this paper. The do-
mestic country premium is substantially higher on trips
without a Saturday-night stayover, which indicates that
the premium applies in particular to the domestic busi-
ness segment and corroborates a market power in-
terpretation of the identified fare patterns.
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These findings contribute to the empirical literature
on airline market power. Although our current anal-
ysis does not permit us to empirically pinpoint the un-
derlying mechanisms that drive our results, domestic
market power is established as an important and eco-
nomically relevant force in international airline compe-
tition. For instance, domestic airlines’ favorable position
over foreign competitors when operating out of their
domestic country could represent a substantial barrier
to the ongoing process of liberalization and market
integration in international aviation.
A first direction for future research on this subject is
to investigate what factors confer market power on
domestic airlines. We discussed a number of potential
domestic advantages, including a traveler bias for do-
mestic products, general brand effects, frequent flier
programs, and governmental protectionism. Discerning
the relative importance of such underlying factors
is an imperative step toward a welfare assessment of
domestic market power. Furthermore, we examine do-
mestic market power in markets that are characterized
by the presence of one distinct domestic airline and the
absence of low-cost carriers. It would be interesting if
further research could investigate to what extent these
and other local market conditions impact the degree
of domestic market power that airlines are able to
exercise.
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Endnotes
1 In light of frequent flier programs, one might be concerned that the
premium paid by travelers reflects the implied price subsidy of the
accumulated frequent flier miles. A back-of-the-envelope calculation
provided in a later section illustrates how our estimates of the do-
mestic country premium are much larger than the upper bound of
this implied price subsidy.
2DeWit (2014) describes a particular case in which the German Federal
Office for Goods Transport forced Emirates to increase prices of its
business-class tickets, to complywith a clause in the bilateral air service
agreement between the United Arab Emirates and Germany.
3 In Section 4.3 we show that our findings are robust to these selection
criteria.
4We checked whether operation of one or both of the feeder legs
by a regional partner (instead of the ticketing airline) impacts
fares and found no statistically significant effect. Moreover, in-
clusion of covariates related to regional partner operations did not
substantially alter the point estimates of our main effects or other
covariates.
5The only flights in our data for which this is the case are flights
involving a transfer from Paris Orly International Airport (ORY) to
Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport (CDG), or vice versa.
6The market shares are measured in terms of the airlines’ scheduled
departing seats operated at the airport in March 2016.
7We use the latter to calculate the length of the feeder flight legs for
each trip.
8The discrepancy between the number of origins anddestinations on the
one hand, and the number of origin–destination markets on the other
hand, arises because not every origin is connected to every destination.
9All figures throughout this section make a distinction between
domestic- and foreign-originating fares. In the online appendix we
provide a second set of figures with an additional distinction between
trips that are booked 56 and seven days in advance. These figures
show that the number of booking days has a substantial impact on
fares and, importantly, that our main observation of higher domestic-
relative to foreign-originating fares also holds in the subsets of trips
that are booked 56 and seven days in advance.
10Closer inspection of Figures 6 and 7 leads to the conclusion that there
is no clear interaction between domestic-originating trips and the
number of days booked in advance and only a marginal interaction
between domestic-originating trips and the length of stay. The latter,
however, likely results from the strong correlation between trips with
a four-day length of stay and trips without a Saturday-night stayover.
11The feeder leg length enters linearly in ourmodel specifications.We
tried various nonlinear specifications, which did not lead to different
results.
12The main reason for choosing a competitor count approach instead
of, for example, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is that the market
shares at the market level needed to calculate this index cannot be
defined in a straightforward way for connecting markets. Note that
connecting markets consist of two separate leg markets. Moreover,
a given origin–destination market consists of a multitude of different
leg market combinations. Even if one would collect market shares for
all these separate leg markets, it is not possible to determine which
part of these market shares can be attributed to a specific origin–
destination market, because the individual leg markets are typically
part of multiple different origin–destination markets.
13Note that we implicitly assume that, conditional on main flight leg
and trip characteristics, the fares for the trips are date and day-of-the-
week invariant. This seems a reasonable assumption given that we
randomly assigned the trips to the departure dates. In Section 4.3 we
provide the results of a sensitivity analysis that proves the robustness
of our estimates to this assumption.
14Not adjusting for within-cluster error correlation leads to standard
errors that may be too small, which increases the probability of type 1
errors (i.e., falsely rejecting the null hypothesis). See, for example,
Cameron and Miller (2015) for an extensive treatment of cluster-
robust standard errors.
15The correlation of 0.73 between the domestic origin indicator and the
airport-specific airline market share measure might raise concerns
about multicollinearity. The variation inflation factor of the domestic
origin indicator, however, ranges between 1.47 and 2.72 in the baseline
models, which is well belowwhat is usually considered problematic. In
addition, the estimates are stable over the differentmodel specifications.
Hence, we conjecture multicollinearity not to be a substantial concern.
16Coefficient estimates on the control variables are reported in the
online appendix. The majority of the control variables are not sig-
nificant and of low magnitude. The number of competitors on the
origin–destination market, however, has a substantial and significant
negative impact on the fare levels.
17Note that these estimates relate to a model in which we control for
airport dominance by the airline, using the airport-specific market
shares of the airlines. Controlling for airport dominance by the al-
liance (we do not explicitly report this model in Table 4) results in
insignificant estimates of the airport dominance premium and con-
tributes very little to the model reported in column (1).
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18Note that offering a fare below costs might still be profitable, be-
cause it might allow airlines to achieve higher load factors or enable
increased frequencies on the main flight leg.
19A quick analysis of the Lufthansa tickets in our data illustrates that
93% of the tickets are Economy Saver, Economy Basic, or Economy
Basic Plus tickets, which accrue 50% of the actual trip miles or less.
Unfortunately, we cannot provide a similar analysis for the full
sample owing to unavailability of Air France booking class data.
20Consider the following simple calculation to determine the order of
magnitude of the implied price subsidy of frequent flier miles. We
assume a traveler is flying on a ticket with 100% miles accrual and
only qualifies for the lowest tier within the frequent flier program
(i.e., gains no miles accrual bonus). Under these assumptions, the
maximum number of miles to be earned on a domestic-originating
trip is approximately 14,000 for both Air France and Lufthansa.
Furthermorewe assume that travelers spend their awardmiles on gift
vouchers only, because their monetary value is most clear. In both
programs there are opportunities to buy gift vouchers of 10 euro for
3,000 and 4,000 miles. Hence, the implied price subsidy—taking into
account the average fare of approximately 1,000 euro in our data
set—is on the order of magnitude of 3.5%–4.6%. This implied price
subsidy is likely to be an overestimation, because not every domestic
traveler participates in the airline’s frequent flier program, the ma-
jority of the tickets in our sample has a miles accrual percentage
of 50% or less, and redemption rates are typically far below 100%
(e.g., Smith and Sparks 2009).
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